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IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

*
*

PRICE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., *
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*

vs.

*
*
*
*

HAL FOUTZ, et ux.,

Case No. 16,688

Defendants-Appellants.*

*
*

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought suit in unlawful detainer against
Defendants for possession of home and treble damages; together
with an action for the Court determining ownership and immediate
possession of the residence together with a reasonable attorney's
fee and costs.

Defendant counterclaimed for specific perfor-

mance of contract or in the alternative to specific performance,
damages, both compensatory and punitive together with a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable David Sam of the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah county, without a jury, ruled that the written
Agreement between the parties was clear and unambiguous; that
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Plaintiff was entitled to immediate possession of the house and
ordered Defendants to vacate the residence; that Defendants
were entitled to have returned the $10,000.00 down payment less
$350.00 per month as rent for the premises during Defendants'
occupancy.

The Court ruled that the Defendants were in default

under the Agreement between the parties.

The Court further

ruled that Defendants were guilty of unlawful detainer, that
Plaintiff was entitled to treble damages but offset the treble
damages by reason of the increased value of the house since
the parties entered into the contract of sale.

The Court allowed

an offset of Plaintiff's damages against the $10,000.00 down
payment which Defendants made on the house.

The Court gave

Defendants credit for $300.00 improvement on the yard, improvements in the house not to exceed $1,000.00 and awarded Plaintiff
$1,550.00 in attorney's fee together with costs.

The Court

ruled that 61-2-2 UCA, 1953, was not applicable.

The Court

further ruled that the Plaintiff had made full disclosure to
Defendants and had not misrepresented the house.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the decision and
judgment of the lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
With reference to rule 75 (p)

(2) URCP, the respondent

disagrees with the statement of facts contained in the Brief of
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the Appellant.

The Respondent hereafter states the facts,

relevant to the points raised on appeal as it finds them:
(The Agreement)
On May 25, 1978, the parties entered into a written
Agreement, Exhibit 1.

(T.3-4).

Under the terms of the Agree-

ment (Exhibit 1) Price Construction Company, the Plaintiff and
Respondent, agreed to sell to Hal Foutz and Liane Foutz, the
Defendants and Appellants, a certain residence located at 757
North 450 East, Orem, Utah.
lines 47 and 48:

Exhibit l

states, inter alia at

"this earnest money supersedes earnest money

written November 29, 1977 .•. "

Exhibit l also acknowledges at

lines 49 and SO an earnest money deposit of $600.00.

Also,

conunencing at line 14, Exhibit l acknowledges receipt of a
payment of $10,000.00 from the buyers to the seller.

Exhibit

l provides that buyers shall pay monthly rent in the amount of
$350.00 per month until August 1, 1978 at which time the house
was to close at which time the balance of $41,400.00 shown on
line 14 was to be paid.

Exhibit l further provides that if the

closing did not take place as scheduled on August 1, 1978,
that buyers would return possession of the residence to the seller
and the sellers would refund the $10,000.00 deposit when the home
was sold.
Exhibit l provides at line 52 that "time is of the
essence of this Agreement."
The Court found that Exhibit l was not ambiguous and
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
was a Sponsored
fairby the
contract;
(T.13,
T.79,
the
Library Services and
Technology Act,
administeredT.90)
by the Utah State Accordingly,
Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Court, with reference to lines 47 and 48 of Exhibit 1, quoted
above, declined to receive into evidence a prior earnest money
between the parties dated November 29, 1977.
There is no reference in the Agreement of the parties,
Exhibit 1, to FHA or VA financing.

The box on the multiple

listing agreement (Exhibit 5) wherein a seller evidences an
agreement to pay FHA or VA points is not checked.
(Alleged Misrepresentations as to FHA or VA Financing)
Apart from the written Agreements, the Defendants were
advised that the Plaintiff would not agree to an FHA or VA sale
(with an accompanying payment of "points" by seller).

The

record shows the following:
Mr. Whitney Lund was the real estate agent who handled
the sales transaction for the subject residence.

He had several

discussions with the Defendants:
"I told Mr. and Mrs. Foutz that the seller had not
agreed to pay the FHA or VA points on the home, but
that the home-or rather they could probably finance
the home FHA if they were willing to make an offer
at a higher price than $52,000.00 list price.
(T.42)
On cross-examination by counsel for the Defendants,
Mr. Lund clarified his testimony regarding FHA or VA financing:
"I did not tell Mr. Foutz that the house would
qualify for FHA or VA.
I told him it would probably qualify and we had discussed that prior to
making the original offer in November of 1977.
(T.51)
Later in the trial, Mr. Lund was again asked about
FHA or VA financing.

He was specifically asked if he had dis-
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cussed such financing with Mr. Price, the principal of Price
Construction Company and Mr. Lund stated:
"Okay.
Mr. Price has always stated that he would not
pay the discount points with regards to FHA or VA offers,
but he would consider paying them if the sales price
came in higher."
(T.54)
Mr. Lund was then asked if he conveyed the foregoing
conversation to the Defendants, to which he responded:
"We determined that we would go conventionally rather
than FHA or VA."
(T.54)
Mr. Lund was again asked about FHA or VA financing and
the following questions and answers ensued:
"Q.
Did you relay the conversation that you had with
Mr. Price regarding the VA and FHA to Mr. and Mrs. Foutz?
A.

Yes.

I did.

Q. What response, if any did they make to the conversation that you relayed to them?
A. After showing them some financial calculations
on how much money they would save by going either way,
they· deten:i.ined that it would be best if they went conventionally and that is how the offer was made.

Q. I believe you testified that you filled out Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, is that correct sir?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q. Was that done on the meeting on May 25, 1978,
at which meeting Mr. Price and Mr. and Mrs. Foutz and
yourself was present?
A.

Yes.

Q.

If Price Construction were to pay FHA and VA points,
is there a customary practice in the industry with respect
to the manner in which you indicate that on the prospective agreement?

A.
There is a custom or practice in the industry, at
least in this valley, if an offer is going to be made
FHA or VA because points can fluctuate anywhere from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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three to ten per cent. We normally put the maximum
amount of points which the seller will agree to pay
on a FHA or VA offer.
Q.
Does any language such as that appear on Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 1 as you can observe it?
(indicating)

A.

No language appears."

(T.55, emphasis added)

The multiple listing agreement, Exhibit 5, contains
no reference to payment by seller of FHA or VA points and there
was testimony that it is customary in Utah County to indicate
an agreement by the seller to pay points if the residence is
to be sold FHA or VA.

(T.52)

Exhibit 1 was signed by the parties on May 25, 1978,
at which meeting Mr. Whitney Lund, the real estate agent, Mr.
Brian Crandall, a representative of Price Construction Company
and Mr. and Mrs. Foutz were in attendance.

With regard to

that meeting, Mr. Crandall was asked whether FHA or VA points were
discussed and Mr. Crandall responded:
"THE WITNESS:
It was brought up by Mr. Foutz. He mentioned a little background at this point as they were
pleading for an extension of time. They insisted they
had financing in process and they wanted an extension
and he brought up the point that the reasons they
needed an extension is that they had wasted time trying
to get FHA and VA financing.
Q.

To which you responded?

A.
I was surprised because this is the first time we
had heard that they were even interested in FHA and
VA being the offer was made conventional.

Q.

What did you say to Mr. Foutz?

A.

I said that it can't go FHA or VA.

Q.

To which he responded?

A.Sponsored
Heby thesays
that I know that now.
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q.

This was prior to the signing of the agreement?

A. This was before they signed the offer.
correct.
Q.

That is all."

That is

(T.120-121, emphasis added)

Mr. Brian Crandall also testified as follows regarding
FHA or VA financing:
Q. Now were you present at the time that Exhibit l
was filled out?

A.

Yes I was.

Q. Did you or the real estate agent at anytime suggest
that it be placed on Exhibit l that the home would not
qualify for FHA or VA financing?

A.

No, it was not.

It was not brought up.

Q. Didn't you think that was rather a significant point,
a person buying a home?

A. No, because Mr. Foutz did understand that it not go
(T.122-12'.
FHA. There was no reason to put that on there."
The Defendant himself was asked on cross-examination
about his understanding regarding FHA and VA financing at the
time Exhibit l was signed by the parties on May 25, 1978.

Mr.

Foutz testified as follows:
"Q.
I would be glad to talk as loud as you would like.
You testified did you not at the beginning of your
testimony that at the meeting on May 25, 1978, you understood that Mr. Price would not pay the points?

A. That is correct. That is what Mr. Whitney Lund told
us. Mr. Price never told us.
Q. You understood through Mr. Lund that Mr. Price would
not pay FHA or VA points?

A.

That is correct."

(T.99, emphasis added)
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(Plaintiff as Owner or a Broker)
On the question of ownership of the subject residence,
Mr. Lawrence M. Price testified that he was president of Price
Construction Company, Inc.

(T.3)

Mr. Price then testifies

as follows:
"Q.
Is Price Construction Company the owner and builder
of the subject residence located at or about 757 North
450 East in Orem?

A.

Yes sir."

There was no evidence contracting the foregoing testimony
as to ownership of the subject residence.
The record demonstrates the following with respect to
the $600.00 earnest money and the $10,000.00 down payment paid
by the Defendants:

Mr. Lawrence Price testified that the initial

$600.00 earnest money deposit was paid to Courtesy Realty at
the time of the initial offer in approximately November of 1977
and that said amount was later in August of 1978 devided between
Courtesy Realty and Mr. Whitney Lund and the Plaintiff corporation.
Mr. Price futher testified that the $10,000.00 down payment was
made directly to Price Construction Company by which the money
was used to pay off obligations for purchase of the subject lot.
(T.16)
Mr. Whitney Lund likewise testified that the $10,000.00
down payment was made directly to Plaintiff.

(T.38)

After the August 1, 1978 closing date had passed the
$600.00 was divided with Courtesy Realty retaining $150.00,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the salesman, Mr. Lund receiving $150.00 and Larry Price received
$300.00.

(T.46-47)

At page 87 of the transcript, the Defendant,

Mrs. Foutz, testified on cross-examination that, apparently, it
was her understanding that Price Construction would use the
$10,000.00, at the time it was received, to pay off certain debts
with respect to the home.

(T.87)

(Fairness and Equities Between the Parties)
Commencing at page 90 of the transcript, the Court made
an extended observation concerning the facts in evidence to
that point in the trial.

Commencing part way through the com-

ments of the Court, Judge Sam stated as follows:
" •.. but as I read the contract I feel that it appears
on its face to be a very fair contract.
I don't see
anything on the contract on its fact that would in any
way appear not to be entirely fair.
In fact, it appears
in my judgment to be fairer than most contracts relative
to monies paid down. This contract provides that the
$10,000.00 will be returned and it appears that these
buyers, unfortunate as it appears to be, that they are
unable to get financing which I don't know how you can
penalize the seller for that fact.
The fact that they
can't get financing, I don't know how you can penalize
the seller for that unfortunate circumstance.
I feel
bad that they haven't been able to get financing, but
to ask this court to carry this, the occupancy of this
home on at infinitum--it has been occupied now since,
apparently I gather now from this testimony I thought
it was May of 1978 but it has been occupied by these
Defendants since December of 1977 apparenlty?
MR. TAYLOR:

That is correct sir.

THE COURT: And if they are unable to get financing,
I don't know how you can penalize the seller for that
unless the seller did some act that was so offensive
in the way of fraud or misrepresentation or through
some fraudulent inducement that causes these buyers
these problems and I do not at this point see those
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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types of facts.
Now what else do you have to present?
You may proceed to try and convince me, but I don't
s7e those types of ~acts and circumstances in this particular case.
Now if you have law on this question of
this seller being a real estate broker and using this
$10,000.00 in some dubious illegal way pursuant to the
statutes, maybe you can convince me on this but this
defendant says that it was her understanding that they
were going to pay off the debts with that $10,000.00.
I don't see the type of conduct or even the statute
we are concerned with here that would cause me to make
some finding that would penalize this seller when it
appears on the face of this contract that they prepared a contract for--on its face it appears to be
extremely fair.
Counsel now that is my observation.
(T. 90-91)
Lastly, it should be observed that two original transcripts
of the trial proceedings have been made.

The foregoing statement

of facts have been taken from an original transcript dated July
17

I

1979.
(Matters not in the Record)
At trial, there was contradictory testimony from witnesses

for both Defendants as to whether the buyers, Mr. and Mrs. Foutz,
as opposed to the seller, could pay the FHA and VA points.

Sub-

sequent to trial, Exhibits were attached to Memoranda by the
parties supplementing their position on this issue.

Appellants

have included some of these Exhibits, which were not received
into evidence, as part of their statement of facts.

It is the

position of the Plaintiff that these Exhibits, which were not
received at trial, should not be considered on appeal.

In the

event the Court decides it should consider the same, the Plaintiff
makes reference to the letter attached to its Memorandum of Points
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and Authorities dated June 7, 1977, from Mr. L.

c.

Romney,

Supervisor of Region VIII of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to the effect that regulations of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development "require that the discount points,
if any, are paid by the seller of the property."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A R G U M E N T
POINT I
THE FINDING OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL
COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE
AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL.
It is the established rule of the Utah Supreme court that
Findings of Fact made by a trial judge will not be disturbed
on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence.

Mr. Lawrence Price, President of the Plaintiff corporation testified that that corporation was the owner and builder
of the subject residence.

The sales Agreement, Exhibit 1

recites the Plaintiff, Price Construction Company as the seller
of the subject agreement.

Based on this competent evidence,

it is respectfully submitted that the trial court, Judge Sam,
correctly found at paragraph one of the Findings of Fact that
the Plaintiff, a Utah corporation, is the owner of a residence
located at or about 757 North 450 East, Orem, Utah.
The transcript of proceedings and the foregoing Statement
of Facts demonstrate that the Defendants and Appellants were
repeatedly advised that the Plaintiff would not agree to FHA
or VA financing.

Consistent therewith, the multiple listing

agreement, Exhibit 5, and the actual agreement between the parties,
Exhibit 1, contains no expression to the effect that the seller
and Plaintiff would pay FHA or VA points.

Testimony was received

that it is customary in the real estate practice in Utah County
to show in the earnest money agreement, that the seller will
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pay FHA or VA points because the same are a considerable expense
to the seller.

Accordingly, there was considerable competent

evidence to support findings to the effect that the Plaintiff
did not agree to sell the subject residence by FHA or VA financing.
Further, there is competent evidence to support the
findings of the Court that the Plaintiff made no misrepresentations to Defendants prior to signing the subject agreement,
Exhibit 1.
Mr. Lawrence Price and Mr. Whitney Lund both testified
thatthe$600.00 earnest money deposit was paid to Plaintiff
through Century 21 Courtesy Realty and that the Defendants
thereafter paid $10,000.00 as down payment directly to the
Plaintiff and that Defendants had full knowledge and disclosure
of these actions.
The Defendants admit they remain in the subject residence
and that they did not close as required on August 1, 1978.
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff and Respondent
respectfully submit that the trial court correctly found in favor
of the Plaintiff on all of the foregoing Findings of Fact, which
Findings should be sustained by the Court on appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

POINT II
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 61-2-1
ET SEQ. UCA DO NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY
RELIEF IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT AND
ADVERSE
TO THE RESPONDENT UNDER
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
The Court at paragraph one (1) of its Findings of Fact
found:
"Plaintiff, a Utah Corporation, is the owner of a residence located at or about 757 North 450 East, Orem,
Utah."
That same Plaintiff is the seller to the Defendants under the
terms of the subject Agreement, Exhibit 1.
The provisions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. UCA control
the activities, inter alia of real estate brokers as defined in
Section 61-2-2 UCA.

An exception to the application of Section

61-2-1 et ~· UCA is found in the second paragraph of Section
61-2-2 UCA:
"The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any
person, partnership, association or corporation who
as owner or lessor shall perform any of the acts aforementioned with reference to property owned or leased
by such person, partnership, association or corporation
nor to isolated transactions by persons holding a duly
executed power of attorney from the owner nor shall
this chapter be construed to include in any way the
services rendered by an attorney at law in performing
his duties as such attorney at law nor shall it apply
to a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, administrator,
or executor, or any person acting under order of any
court nor to a trustee under a deed of trust of [or]
a will nor to their employees."
(Section 61-2-2 UCA,
emphasis added)
It is thus respectfully submitted that the provisions of
Section 61-2-1 et seq. UCA do not apply to the Plaintiff in this
action which was selling property owned by it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In addition, reference is made to Section 61-2-17 which
is the penalty provision for the subject chapter on real estate
brokers.

Subsection (a) of 61-2-17 provides criminal penalties

and thus does not have application to the present action.

Sub-

section (b) provides for money damages for violation of the provisions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. UCA.

With reference to that

subsection, it is respectfully submitted that no monies were
received by the Plaintiff as commission, compensation or profit
by or in consequence of the Plaintiff's violation of any provision of the subject act, nor was there any evidence demonstrating damages within the meaning of said subsection.
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff and Respondent
respectfully submits to the Court that no claim or relief under
the provisions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. UCA has been demonstrated under the facts of the case as found in the transcript
of the proceedings.
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POINT III
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS HAVE NOT
AS A MATTER OF LAW ESTABLISHED THEIR
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MISREPRESENTATION.
The defense of misrepresentation is affirmative and the
burden is upon the Defendant to establish it by a preponderance
of the evidence.
The contractual defenses of misrepresentation and fraud
each include the proposition that the offending party must be
demonstrated to have misstated a material fact and that the misstatement, if any, was relied upon by the other party, in this
case the Defendants, as a basis upon which he determined to enter
into the subject Agreement.
In the present action, Mr. Brian Crandall, Mr. Lawrence
Price and Mr. Whitney Lund affirmatively testified that at all
times they had advised Mr. Foutz that Price Construction Company
would not agree to sell the subject house by means of FHA or
VA financing.

Mr. Foutz, upon cross-examination, indicated

that prior to entering into the Agreement on May 25, 1978, he
knew Price would not pay FHA or VA points.
Cross-examination of Mr. Foutz demonstrated that the
Plaintiff made no misstatement to mislead Mr. Foutz with respect
to FHA or VA financing prior to entering into the May 25, 1978
Agreement.

Cross-examination likewise demonstrated that Mr.

Foutz could not have relied upon Price Construction Company to
cooperate with the FHA or VA financing because he understood
prior to entering into the subject Agreement that Mr. Price would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not cooperate with the same.
Thus, there is neither a misstatement nor any reliance
upon any misstatement.
In Sharp vs. Idaho Investment Corp., 504 P.2d 386 (Idaho
1972), a Dr. Sharp alleged fraudulent

misrepresentations on

the part of the Idaho Investment Corporation pursuant to which
he purchased certain stock.

The Idaho Supreme Court, in the

foregoing case, used the following language in regard to reliance
"Reliance is a fundamental element of fraud which must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In order
for the respondent, Dr. Sharp, to secure redress he must
have, in fact, relied upon a statement or representation
as an inducement to purchase the stock. We find a notable absence of the element of reliance supporting the
district court's finding of fraud.
On direct examination Dr. Sharp was asked:
"Doctor,
would you tell me why you purchased stock in the Idaho
Investment Corporation?" Dr. Sharp replied, "Because
I believed Mr. Neilson.
I was acquainted with Mr.
Frazier and other officers of Sierra Life.
I knew the
officers and expected it to be a profitable venture."
This answer reveals a common theme which appears through·
out the record. Dr. Sharp was an investor in Sierra
Life Insurance Company, an Idaho corporation.
By coincidence most of the officers of Idaho Investment Corporation were officials of Sierra Life Insurance Company. For example, Fred Frazier was president of both
Idaho Investment Corporation and Sierra Life Insurance
Company. Although this inter-locking feature of corporate officials was publicized extensively by Idaho
Investment Corporation in its sales materials and
company news bulletins, neither the respondents nor
the district court chose to attach any significance
to its connection with the element of reliance.
From
Dr. Sharp's own testimony it is evident that rather--than relying on representations or misstatements by
Idaho Investment Corporation and its agents he relied
on expectations based on his experience with another
corporation." Sharp vs. Idaho Investment Corporation,
supra, (emphasis added).
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The Defendant, Mr. Foutz was questioned at page 99 of
the transcript to determine if he had, in signing the subsequent
Agreement, Exhibit 1, relied upon facts relating to the application of FHA or VA financing to the subject residence.

In the

manner of Dr. Sharp in Sharp vs. Idaho Investment Corporation,
supra, Mr. Foutz admitted that he knew when he signed the subject Agreement that Price Construction would not agree to such
forms of financing.

He thus could not have justifiably relied

upon ideas to the contrary.
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the Defendants and Appellants have failed to establish
their affirmative defense of misrepresentation.
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POINT IV
THE SUBJECT AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS; PAROLE EVIDENCE IS NOT
ADMISSABLE; DEFENDANTS ARE IN DEFAULT
OF THE AGREEMENT AND FORFEIT THEIR
CLAIMS TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY;
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE BECAUSE OF DEFENDANTS'
DEFAULT.
The trial court correctly ruled that the Agreement
between the parties is fair, clair and not ambiguous.

The trial

court thus correctly held the parties to the terms thereof and
correctly refused to permit the Defendants to vary the terms
of that Agreement as to financing and other matters.
The subject Agreement, Exhibit 1, provides that Defendants were to close on August 1, 1978.
stated.

There are no exceptions

The Defendants were to pay the balance of $41,400.00

at the closing.

No exceptions are stated.

If the closing did

not take place on August 1, 1978, the Defendants were to move
out and they would be repaid their $10,000.00 down payment
when Plaintiff could resell the home.
Time is of the essence.

No exception is stated.

See line 52 of the subject Agreement.

Defendants did not close as required and they refused
to move out of the subject residence.

They were in default

and forfeited their claims against the property.

Plaintiff is

entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee, lines 45-46 of Exhibit
1, because of the defendant's default.
Defendants will receive back their down payment less
rent accrued and Plaintiff is therefore not unjustly enriched.
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Defendants can not rightly claim to have specific enforcement of this subject Agreement with respect to which they are in
default.
The trial court correctly refused to permit the Defendants
to amend the terms of the Agreement, Exhibit 1, by parole evidence.
The intent and obligations of the parties to their
Agreement should be determined from the language within the four
corners thereof because it is free of ambiguity.
The foregoing rule represents a conscious policy decision
on the part of the Utah Supreme Court.

The parties should be

held to their clearly expressed intention or the orderly conduct
of affairs would quickly stop.

If the Defendants were allowed to

amend the Agreement to now substitute their wish to finance by
way of FHA or VA financing and the accompanying payment of discount points together with other privileges all of which are
clearly not referred to in the subject Agreement, there would
be an end to reliable and dependable contracts.
Henroid in Jensen Used Cars vs. Rice,

Thus, Justice

(1958):

"Elementary it is that in construing contracts we
seek to determine the intentions of the parties. But
it is also elementary and of extreme practical importance that we hold contracting parties to their clear
and understandable language deliberately committed
to writing and endorsed by them as signato:ies
thereto. Were this not so business, one with anoth7r
among our citizens, would be relegated to the chaotic,
and the basic purpose of the law to supp~y enforceable
rules of conduct for the maintenance and improvement of
an orderly society's welfare and progress would find
itself impotent.
It is not unreasonable to hold one
responsible for language which he himself espouses.
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fashion a determination as to the intentions of the
parties. Under such circumstances we should not be
required to embosom any request that we ignore that
very language. This is as it should be. The rule
excluding matters outside the four corners of a clear,
understandable document, is a fair one, and one's contentions concerning his intent should extend no further
than his own clear expressions."
Jensen Used Cars vs. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1958).
The Agreement between the parties of May 25, 1978 is
quite clear and specific.

Utah law would permit the trial court

to listen to parole explanations by the Defendants Hal and Liane
Foutz "only where there is some genuine lack of certainty."

The

phrase "genuine lack of certainty" does not refer to "strained
or merely fanciful or wishful interpretations that may be
indulged in."

Maw v. Noble, supra, 354 P.2d at 123.

"In interpreting a contract, the primary rule is to
determine what the parties intended by what they said.
The court may not add, ignore or discard words in the
process, but attempts to render certain the meaning
of the provision in dispute by an objective and reasonable construction of the whole contract."
Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d
928 I

929 I

(1962) •

"In considering the controversy here it is well to keep
in mind the fundamental concepts in regard to contracts:
that their purpose is to reduce to writing the conditions upon which the minds of the parties have met
and to fix their rights and duties in respect thereto.
The intent so expressed is to be found, if possible within the four corners of the instrument itself in accordance with the ordinary accepted meaning of the words
used.
Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the
language so that the meaning is confused, or is susceptible or more than one meaning, there is no justification for interpretation or explanation from extraneous sources. It would defeat the very purpose of formal
contracts to permit a party to invoke the use of words
or conduct inconsistent with its terms to prove that the
parties did not mean what they said, or to use such inconsistent
works
conduct
toInstitute
demonstrate
uncertainty
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The terms of the Agreement of May 25, 1978, control.
There is no reference to payment of FHA or VA discount points
and no agreement to cooperate in FHA or VA financing.

The

terms of that Agreement are quite specific as to the amount of
cash to be paid and the time at which such shall be paid.

The

Agreement is likewise clear that time is of the essence and it

is further clear that previous agreements are specifically
superseded by the subject Agreement.

Whether or not Price

Construction Company could have agreed to FHA or VA financing
is immaterial.

The Plaintiff simply did not agree to it.

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the lower court correctly held the parties to the terms
of the subject Agreement and refused specific enforcement of
the subject Agreement in favor of the Defendants and granted
Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully
submitted that the trial court correctly determined the facts
in this matter based upon the evidence received at trial.

It

is respectfully submitted that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by the Court after trial accurately state
the facts in the case and the Plaintiff respectfully requests

I

I

the Court to affirm the decision of the lower court, the Honorable1
David Sam, presiding.

Respectfully submitted:

RICHARD S. DALEBOUT
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South
Provo, Utah
84601
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